Thursday 3 March 2011
Sunday 22 March 2009
Sunday 15 June 2008
Wakestock 2008
WAKESTOCK 2008
Abersoch, Cardigan Bay, North Wales
Fri 4 - Sun 6 June 2008
This summer sees the return of Wales’ hottest festival: Relentless Wakestock 2008. Coming into its eighth year, Wakestock is back and bigger than ever, ready to rock the socks off the normally tranquil Llyn Peninsular in North Wales. A whole host of bands and DJs will be playing out to the crowds at night, and you can forget the hangover because during the day there'll be more Wakeboarding to feast your eyes on than you can shake a wetsuit at.
Based around three locations; Abersoch beach, Pwllheli marina and the main festival site at Penrhos (with convenient shuttle buses between them), this festival really does have it all: beach, town and festival field. The line-up this year definitely looks set to impress, with Mark Ronson, Groove Armada, The Streets, Duffy, The Happy Mondays, Funeral For a Friend, The Hoosiers, Calvin Harris, The Futureheads, Pendulum, Elliot Minor, Hadouken, The Mystery Jets and Sam Sparro to name (well, more than) just a few. What with Jo Whiley and Zane Lowe taking to the decks, too, your ears won’t know what’s hit them.
Of course, the unique thing about Wakestock is the combination of music festival and sports event. Wakeboarding, the summer alternative to snowboarding, is the latest, greatest thing to hit watersport. Riders are towed behind a speed-boat at around 25mph and use the boat’s ‘wake’ to perform spectacular tricks and spins. The festival has embraced the increased use of rails in the sport, and boasts some of the first and finest outside of the USA for this Vans Rococo Tour. Pwllheli marina plays host to both the pro and amateur Wakeboarding competitions and the Wakestock rail course, where riders compete in front of 8,000 spectators not only to finish their run, but to perform outstanding moves.
And if the line-up and Wakeboarding aren’t quite enough, the spectacular views across Cardigan Bay and the peaks of Snowdonia in the distance are well-worth craning your neck for.
Admission: Weekend tickets £85-£110. Info: 01758 710000 / www.wakestock.co.uk
Sarah Pavey
Abersoch, Cardigan Bay, North Wales
Fri 4 - Sun 6 June 2008
This summer sees the return of Wales’ hottest festival: Relentless Wakestock 2008. Coming into its eighth year, Wakestock is back and bigger than ever, ready to rock the socks off the normally tranquil Llyn Peninsular in North Wales. A whole host of bands and DJs will be playing out to the crowds at night, and you can forget the hangover because during the day there'll be more Wakeboarding to feast your eyes on than you can shake a wetsuit at.
Based around three locations; Abersoch beach, Pwllheli marina and the main festival site at Penrhos (with convenient shuttle buses between them), this festival really does have it all: beach, town and festival field. The line-up this year definitely looks set to impress, with Mark Ronson, Groove Armada, The Streets, Duffy, The Happy Mondays, Funeral For a Friend, The Hoosiers, Calvin Harris, The Futureheads, Pendulum, Elliot Minor, Hadouken, The Mystery Jets and Sam Sparro to name (well, more than) just a few. What with Jo Whiley and Zane Lowe taking to the decks, too, your ears won’t know what’s hit them.
Of course, the unique thing about Wakestock is the combination of music festival and sports event. Wakeboarding, the summer alternative to snowboarding, is the latest, greatest thing to hit watersport. Riders are towed behind a speed-boat at around 25mph and use the boat’s ‘wake’ to perform spectacular tricks and spins. The festival has embraced the increased use of rails in the sport, and boasts some of the first and finest outside of the USA for this Vans Rococo Tour. Pwllheli marina plays host to both the pro and amateur Wakeboarding competitions and the Wakestock rail course, where riders compete in front of 8,000 spectators not only to finish their run, but to perform outstanding moves.
And if the line-up and Wakeboarding aren’t quite enough, the spectacular views across Cardigan Bay and the peaks of Snowdonia in the distance are well-worth craning your neck for.
Admission: Weekend tickets £85-£110. Info: 01758 710000 / www.wakestock.co.uk
Sarah Pavey
Chickenshed ... 'As the Mother of a Brown Boy'
AS THE MOTHER OF A BROWN BOY ...
Wales Millennium Centre, Cardiff
Fri 20 June
Chickenshed are a somewhat unique theatre company; their raison d’etre is to create a space where 'everyone is welcome, and everyone is valued.' Through a 'unique creative process' they ensure that individuals who have found themselves unwelcome elsewhere, due to difference or disability, are embraced and encouraged.
As the mother of a brown boy ..., a true story, tells of 19-year-old former Chickenshed member Mischa Niering, through the voice of his mother. Using a combination of dance, physical theatre, multimedia and music it portrays Mischa’s life as a mixed-race boy, his identity struggle within a multi-racial society, and ultimately, tragically, his death.
Directed by Mischa’s aunt, Christine Niering, and featuring a cast consisting many of Mischa’s friends, Chickenshed tell his poignant story and hope that it 'will encourage others to question the undercurrent of discrimination and subtlety of racism in society and give a voice to those involved in the pursuit of justice'.
The performance received two Edinburgh Festival Fringe Award nominations last year and was dubbed 'a powerfully emotive piece' - The Times. It looks set to continue impressing, and impressing upon, audiences with its compelling and relevant portrayals of racism, and the choices, both good and bad, made by a troubled young man in today’s society.
Chickenshed are featured as part of a week of events at the WMC celebrating Learing Disability Week (16-20 June).
Admission: £8-£10. Info: 08700 40 2000 / www.wmc.org.uk
Sarah Pavey
Wales Millennium Centre, Cardiff
Fri 20 June
Chickenshed are a somewhat unique theatre company; their raison d’etre is to create a space where 'everyone is welcome, and everyone is valued.' Through a 'unique creative process' they ensure that individuals who have found themselves unwelcome elsewhere, due to difference or disability, are embraced and encouraged.
As the mother of a brown boy ..., a true story, tells of 19-year-old former Chickenshed member Mischa Niering, through the voice of his mother. Using a combination of dance, physical theatre, multimedia and music it portrays Mischa’s life as a mixed-race boy, his identity struggle within a multi-racial society, and ultimately, tragically, his death.
Directed by Mischa’s aunt, Christine Niering, and featuring a cast consisting many of Mischa’s friends, Chickenshed tell his poignant story and hope that it 'will encourage others to question the undercurrent of discrimination and subtlety of racism in society and give a voice to those involved in the pursuit of justice'.
The performance received two Edinburgh Festival Fringe Award nominations last year and was dubbed 'a powerfully emotive piece' - The Times. It looks set to continue impressing, and impressing upon, audiences with its compelling and relevant portrayals of racism, and the choices, both good and bad, made by a troubled young man in today’s society.
Chickenshed are featured as part of a week of events at the WMC celebrating Learing Disability Week (16-20 June).
Admission: £8-£10. Info: 08700 40 2000 / www.wmc.org.uk
Sarah Pavey
Sunday 30 December 2007
Tuesday 12 June 2007
Move Over Ladies, There's a New Girl in Town...
When you think ‘Queen of Pop’, who springs to mind? Britney? Madonna? Christina? Maybe even Shakira? No, no, no. How about the leading lady of the world’s best-selling female group of all time, who's also turned her exceptionally multi-talented and somewhat substantial booty to acting, dancing, being a fashion designer and model? Throw 10 Grammy Awards in the mix and what have you got? Of course, it could be no other. The sizeable posterior of the R&B Dreamgirl herself, the one and only, Beyonce, Beyonce! Sorry, I couldn’t help myself there.
In only her 25th year (at the time of writing), Ms Knowles deserves to be pretty darned pleased with her achievements to date. Following a string of successful releases with Destiny’s Child, including Bills, Bills, Bills, Say My Name and Survivor, she decided to release her first solo album Dangerously In Love in 2003 which topped both the US and UK album charts and included hits like Crazy In Love and Baby Boy - earning her five of her Grammys. Her second solo album, B’day (released on her 25th birthday) followed two years after another album from Destiny’s Child, Destiny Fulfilled was released – and it boasts the number one singles Déjà Vu, Beautiful Liar (with Shakira), Irreplaceable and Upgrade U. Her latest collaboration with Jay-Z won Beyonce her seventh solo Grammy award.
Beyonce has also done what many other artists have failed to do: become a successful name in the movie industry. She has featured in several big-screen productions, starting with Carmen – A Hip Hopera for MTV in 2001. However, Beyonce was catapulted to into the realms of movie stardom in 2002 when she played the memorable role of ‘Foxy Cleopatra’ alongside Mike Myers in the box-office hit Austen Powers in Goldmember. In 2006 Beyonce also featured in lesser-known productions like The Pink Panther, and starred in Dreamgirls, for which she also contributed to the soundtrack.
So, all in all, things aren’t looking too bad for the young R&B star right now. Although B’Day hasn’t been as commercially successful as previous releases, the success of the singles taken from the album so far have totally raised the bar. Future solo offerings will have to be something rather special. This girl has proved she has the balls, grit, determination, pure talent and ambition to do it though, so watch this space!
Dangerously In Love
Released in June 2003, Dangerously In Love was Beyonce’s eagerly anticipated debut solo album. The majority of the album was written and produced by the lady herself, with a little help from her A-list buddies Missy Elliott, Luther Vandross and Jay-Z. Featuring the massive hit Crazy in Love with Jay-Z, Dangerously in Love also satisfies all tastes of those in the pop and R&B camps. With a mixture of contemporary soul, club dancefloor-fillers and heartfelt ballads, she cemented her place in R&B’s solo hall of fame.
B’Day
What with all the experience she gained with Destiny’s Child and her first solo album, you might have thought that B’Day would have been more successful. Which is probably why she re-released it with a DVD and rather a lot of track remixes and Spanish versions of existing songs. Anyway, this album has some of the most memorable singles released so far by the singer, solo or otherwise; Beautiful Liar, Irreplaceable, Déjà Vu, and Upgrade U are hot. This album is far more diverse, even eclectic … some might say weird. And the media circus surrounding it is either a direct response to this, or an elaborate marketing ploy. Either way, as an album, it’s mediocre. Good at best. For the singles so far, it’s the hottest release on the planet right now.
SARAH PAVEY
Monday 23 April 2007
Monstrosity: Cognitive-aesthetic versus indeological-psychoanalytical approaches to Ridley Scott's 'Alien'
The representation of monstrosity in Ridley Scott’s Alien (1979) can be analysed in several ways, but for now I will use a cognitive-aesthetic approach, developed by Noel Carroll in his work ‘The Philosophy of Horror’ (1990), and an ideological-psychoanalytic approach outlined by Robin Wood in his chapters entitled ‘The American Nightmare’ (1986). This essay will then go on to compare the uses and limits of these approaches, concluding with which could be deemed most useful and convincing.
Noel Carroll introduces the term ‘Art-Horror’ as a general theory of horror texts, to 'emphasise the contrast with natural horror' (1990: 13), and claims that to be ‘art-horrified’ is essentially an emotion and that 'this emotion [is what] constitutes the identifying mark of horror' (1990: 13). He goes on to claim that 'monsters are a mark of horror' (1990: 13), and therefore the emotion of ‘art-horror’ must be in response a ‘monster’, his theory does not accept the existence of ‘horror’ texts sans ‘monster’.
Carroll claims that 'the characters in works of horror exemplify for us the way in which to react to the monsters in the fiction' (Carroll, 1990: 17), in other words, if the protagonist, Ripley (Sigourney Weaver) in Alien, is scared then the audience should mirror this emotion. Carroll lists a number of ways in which a character should respond to a ‘monster’, firstly, they should 'shrink from the monster, contracting themselves in order to avoid the grip of the creature but also to avert an accidental brush against this unclean being' (1990: 17). This desire to ‘avoid the grip of the creature’ can be seen clearly in Alien, most prominently when Ripley coaxes the ‘monster’ out from its hiding place in the escape shuttle. She turns her back to the creature, allowing it to approach her, which at the same time partially disagrees with Carroll’s assumption of avoidance, but however, as soon as she sees the alien, she runs and screams. This theory of avoidance is limited partially by the fact that the very nature of cinema is that the audience has a superior knowledge to the characters, therefore our emotion will not always mirror theirs. For example, one of the crew members in Alien climbs down a ladder towards the ‘monster’, clearly fearing what is at the bottom, we however, know the alien will be there and so we are more apprehensive than scared.
The emotion of being ‘Art-Horrified’ consists of 'both physical and cognitive dimensions' (1990: 24) according to Carroll. He goes on to explain that this 'occurent emotional state is one in which some physically abnormal state of felt agitation has been caused by the subjects’ cognitive construct and evaluation of his/her situation' (1990: 27). Therefore, if Ripley experiences the emotion of fear, it will manifest itself as a physical change and as the emotions of the audience are supposed to reflect that of the characters’, we should experience a physical change also. Carroll explains this as the audience being 'in an analogous state to that which fictional characters beset by monsters are described to be in' (1990: 27). The characters in Alien respond to the ‘monster’ with fear and disgust and experience a physical transition which is represented by their movement, be it running from the creature or simply shaking. Carroll defines this as a cognitive-evaluative theory, in other words, thought leads to the emotion of ‘art-horror’ in response to the ‘monster’. Carroll applies this theory to Dracula, but I will adapt it for Alien; there must be 'some state of abnormal, physically felt agitation' which has been caused by 'the thought: that (the alien) is a possible being', and 'by the evaluative thoughts that … (The alien) has the property of being physically (and perhaps morally and socially) threatening in the ways portrayed in the fiction' and that it 'has the property of being impure'. (1990: 27).
The property of ‘being impure’ is built upon by Carroll, who claims that '[One] cannot be art-horrified by an entity that [is not] impure' (1990:28). In Alien, the monster can be considered impure and indeed a ‘fusion’ character because of its acid blood instead of the pure life-giving blood of humans, and its ‘mouth-within-a-mouth’ which appears alongside human qualities such as basic physique and limbs. These apparent binary oppositions of alien and human qualities constitute impurity; 'an object or being is impure if it is categorically interstitial, categorically contradictory, incomplete or formless' (1990: 32).
Carroll lists three ways ‘monsters’ should be perceived by characters in ‘art-horror’; firstly, there must exist a 'theme of visceral revulsion', which I have already alluded to with Ripley’s recoil from the alien. Carroll expands on this point by claiming 'emotionally, these violations of nature are so fulsome and revolting that they frequently produce in characters the conviction that mere physical contact with them can be lethal' (1990: 22). In fact, this ‘conviction of lethality’ is confirmed in Alien by the discovery of their ‘acid-blood’ and their witnessed killings. 'Indescribability' is Carroll’s second condition; the alien is referred to many times without being given a specific name, it is called 'it', 'son of a bitch' and one of the character even states it is 'like a man, it’s huge', reducing his description to the only language he knows. Finally, the ‘monster’ must be 'unclean and disgusting' (1990: 18); there are many images in Alien of the ‘monsters’ mouths opening up, dripping saliva and inducing reactions of disgust and loathing clearly visible on the characters’ faces.
Carroll claims that 'monsters are not only physically threatening, they are also cognitively threatening' (1990: 34). In Alien, the ‘monsters’ are undoubtedly physically threatening, but they are not simply mindless killing machines, they also exhibit an intelligence. When Ripley’s escape ship takes off, several aliens become dislodged from underneath of the craft, apparently having had the intelligence to try and escape with Ripley. The importance of the cognitive threat is compounded by Carroll when he claims that 'it is a remarkable fact about the creatures of horror that very often they do not seem to be of sufficient strength to make a grown man cower' (1990:34), in other words, they are cognitively threatening, rather than physically, in Alien, the ‘monsters’ are both.
In regard to the ‘monsters’ in horror fictions, Carroll describes a four-point ‘complex discovery plot’. Firstly, Onset: 'the monster’s presence is established for the audience' (1990: 99) and secondly, discovery; 'an individual or group learns of the existence of the monster' (:100). However, in Alien these two points cannot be separated out because the audience discovers the ‘monster’ at the same time as the characters do. The third point is ‘Confirmation’, which again, cannot directly be applied to Alien because Carroll claims that the 'discoverers … of the monster convincing some other group of the existence of the creature' (1990: 101). Because of the small crew of the spaceship in Alien, all members of the crew witness the ‘monsters’ and therefore no-one needs convincing of its existence. The fourth point, confrontation, is where 'humanity marches out to meet its monster' … 'in problem/solution format' (1990: 102-3), exemplified by Ripley succeeding in destroying the alien and escaping from the ship. Not all texts follow this basic narrative structure however, therefore using Carroll we cannot analyse these and call them ‘art-horror’.
The basis of Robin Wood’s general theory of horror and monstrosity is that 'normality is threatened by the monster' (Wood, 1986: 78), in Alien, the relative normality of life in space is disrupted by the appearance of ‘monsters’. Wood’s theory comprises three components; normality, the monster and the relationship between the two. Normality, which is 'in general, boringly constant' (1986: 79) can be seen in the ‘stasis’ or ‘sleep’ that the characters are in at the start of the film, until the appearance of the alien. The 'relationship between the two' i.e, normality and the monster, is what 'constitutes the essential subject of the horror film' (1986: 79). The entire narrative of Alien is concerned with a striving to return to a normality (by destroying the alien), which can never entirely be recovered.
Wood builds upon the Freudian idea of repression and distinguishes between ‘basic repression’ and ‘surplus repression’. He claims ‘basic repression’ is what all members of society must undergo in order to be considered human, and surplus repression 'makes us into monogamous heterosexual bourgeois patriarchal capitalists … that is, if it works' (1986: 71). Wood then builds on his argument to claim that horror is a 'struggle for recognition of all that our civilisation represses or oppresses, its re-emergence dramatized as … an object of horror … and the happy ending (when it exists) typically signifying the restoration of repression' (Wood, 1986: 75). The ‘monster’ (the alien) therefore, represents the dramatization and return of the repressed ‘Other’ in society.
Wood outlines eight repressed terms which are represented by 'monstrous embodiments' (1986: 75); Other people, woman, the proletariat, other cultures, ethnic groups, alternative ideologies or political systems, deviations from ideological sexual norms and children. (1986: 75). When looking at Alien, one of the most applicable repressed terms must be ‘woman’. Wood claims the 'woman’s autonomy and independence are denied' (1986: 75), and the aliens’ predatory behaviour towards Ripley can be seen as a representation of this. However, her victory over the alien and according to Wood, the 'restoration of the repressed' signifies woman’s victory over patriarchy and Ripley’s return, not to her previous patriarchal oppression, but to her symbolic freedom, due to the fact that the rest of the crew have been killed. Therefore, Wood’s theory does not entirely fit.
The repressed ‘proletariat’ is explained by Wood as a projection of the 'bourgeois obsession with cleanliness' (1986: 74). This could be represented in Alien as the clean, almost clinical spaceship being soiled by not only the alien’s presence, but by its secretions in the form of its saliva and blood. The alien may be seen as the return of Wood’s repressed ‘ethnic group’ or indeed ‘other cultures’, as it is not considered human, it is the ‘Other’, and its destruction represents a return to repression and a homogenous ‘human’ society. Wood claims that the representation of ethnic groups is acceptable only if 'they keep their ghetto’s and don’t trouble us with their otherness' or 'they behave as we do and become replicas of the good bourgeois' (1986: 75), which obviously does not happen in Alien, the aliens are aggressive and move onto the ship. Repressed bi-sexuality or homosexuality is represented by the phallic nature by which the alien ‘spawn’ impregnates a male crew member by inserting itself down his throat. The repression returns again however when the spawn detaches itself and dies, returning to symbolic heterosexual normality.
Wood distinguishes between ‘progressive’ and ‘reactionary’ horror, where 'radical [progressive] horror has the monster representing oppressed and repressed forces [for which we have sympathy], while reactionary horror depicts its monsters as "simply evil" and totally non-human' (1986: 192), and Hills consolidates this point by stating that 'Wood posits horror monsters as either sustaining audience identification /sympathy OR as being totally dehumanised, repulsive and threatening' (2005: 50). We can consider Alien a reactionary text, the ‘monster’ is an evil force and we feel no sympathy for it. This approach could be considered more useful than Carroll’s approach however, which dictates that we may never feel sympathy for the ‘monster’, we may only see them as ‘dehumanised’, ‘repulsive’ and ‘threatening’ in a progressive approach. In the fourth film of the series, Alien Resurrection (1997), we distinctly feel sorry for the ‘monster’, to which we learn Ripley has an attachment. This is acceptable according to Wood’s theory, but not Carroll’s. Hills claims that in progressive horror fictions the 'audience revels in the monsters threat to dominant social/cultural norms', which can easily be applied to Alien in the sense that we watch the film in order to see what the ‘monster’ will do and how it will disrupt the ‘norm’. Hills builds on Wood’s approach stating that in reactionary texts 'audiences take pleasure in the monsters narrative destruction and hence the restoration of social/cultural order' (2005: 50), which complies with both Wood and Carroll.
Carroll points out a major criticism of his own work in that he 'hasn’t actually done any empirical research into the reception of the works of horror by audiences. He doesn’t know that they find horrific monsters disgusting and impure. At best, he’s identified his own reaction and introspection and projected it onto everyone else' (1990: 30). This does not mean that his theory of ‘monstrosity’ is inaccurate, but in order to make it more convincing he would need to back it up with empirical research. The same is true of Wood whose theory is simply based on his own assumptions and experiences.
The most obvious limit to Carroll’s theory is that his definition of art-horror only applies to texts with a ‘monster’ which has specific characteristics such as ‘impurity’ and ‘interstitiality’, and is responded to in specific ways. Therefore, a film with a serial-killer for example cannot, by Carroll’s standards be thought of as horror, despite the fact that films such as The Shining (1980) and Psycho (1960) are consistently considered a staple of the genre. It is a 'blanket omission of an entire sub-category of horror: the psychokiller horror film' (Russell, 1998: 238). Carroll’s entity based, cognitive-aesthetic approach provides three strict stipulations: i) Emotion is cognitive, ii) Emotion is always directed at an object, and iii) A monster is what distinguishes horror (1990: 26-37). This approach can be considered useful in the sense that it narrows down what could be termed horror, and filters out ‘genre-bending’ films, but it is severely limited because it does not accept films without a monster even though they might induce the ‘emotion’ and ‘altered physical state’ of art-horror, for example the ‘cinema of terror’ which has no ‘monster’.
Wood’s theory can perhaps be seen as more useful, because it allows for a broader range of ‘monsters’, however, they must represent the return of some repressed group or other. Jancovich argues that 'the horror monster is not always, or even usually, that which is repressed. It is frequently that which is repressive' (1992: 16), if this is the case, we have to consider whether a text with a ‘repressive monster’ can be considered horror by Wood’s definition. Carroll’s theory does not require the ‘monster’ to symbolise, or represent any such thing as the repressed, which means that to Carroll, a horror fiction can have a ‘monster’ for ‘monsters’’ sake without any need for it to represent something else.
Wood’s claim that a horror text can be either progressive or reactionary is useful because it allows for purely evil ‘monsters’, as well as those the audience may have pity for. Carroll’s theory however, only allows ‘monsters’ who are ‘impure’, ‘disgusting’ and repel the characters, and by virtue we feel no sympathy for. For example, Species (1995) may not be regarded as ‘horror’ according to Carroll, but can according to Wood because characters are actually attracted to the ‘monster’. However, this can also be linked to the exclusion of ‘serial killers’ by Carroll, for we are much more likely to feel sympathy for a ‘monster’ who exhibits human characteristics which in turn are only allowed by Wood, over those who are impure and non-human, according to Carroll.
Wood's notion that a ‘monster’ should disrupt normality is useful because it can clearly be applied easily to most horror films in one sense or another. However, this does not account for horror texts where the characters have become used to the ‘monster’ and it may have become part of their normal lives. Carroll’s theory agrees with Wood’s, because we are not going to experience the emotion of ‘art-horror’ in response to a disgusting and terrifying ‘monster’ if it is considered ‘normal’.
According to Carroll, the audience's emotions should mirror that of the characters’ in the text, and generally, this can be seen as useful because to some extent we will always be scared when the protagonist is. However, this is severely limited by the fact that the audience will usually have a superior knowledge to the characters, which renders impossible an exact mirroring of emotions in regard to a specific situation or a ‘monster’. Wood’s theory however allows us to experience our ‘own’ emotions in response to a ‘monster’, we do not have to mirror the characters’ and this is useful because Wood does not try to predict the emotions of the audience, especially without any empirical research.
Jancovich claims that ‘monsters’ should not be the defining feature of horror texts, rather 'if there is any feature which all horror texts share, it is probably the position of the victim – the figure under threat' (1996: 118), he does not claim that they have to be under threat from a ‘monster’ which therefore disagrees with Carroll’s theory. However, the figure could theoretically be under threat from some of entity/situation which represents the ‘repressed’, agreeing with Wood.
Carroll’s theory could be described as overly cognitive in the sense that he claims the emotion of art-horror is resultant from a thought process regarding the aesthetics of the text. However, we must consider the possibility of being ‘art-horrified’ by a text simply because it shocks the audience, the emotion being simply a reflex and not the result of cognition. However, he claims that we must be ‘art-horrified’ by a monster, and therefore even if our emotion was just a reflex, in order for it to be considered, it would have to be in response to a ‘monster’ for Carroll. Building on this, he claims that the ‘monster’ must be ‘physically and cognitively’ threatening, which immediately rules out ‘monsters’ which are simply violent, killing machines, as indeed, ‘Alien’ could be considered. Similarly, Wood’s theory could be described as overly psychoanalytical, only allowing ‘monsters’ which symbolise the repressed, and ruling out those which cannot be attributed to any obvious repression.
Overall, the theories of both Carroll and Wood have their uses which have been outlined, and limits which are most obviously, that a horror text must include a strictly defined ‘monster’, and that a ‘monster’ must represent the ‘repressed’ in society. Carroll’s theory accepts only the more ‘classic’ scary monsters, but does not allow for more contemporary psychological monsters. He is specific in his definition of the ‘monster’, which is useful because we are in no doubt about what can be considered a ‘monster’, but his theory is severely limited by his dismissal of many films, which are readily considered ‘horror’, but do not adhere to his conditions. Wood’s theory seems to have less limits than Carroll’s, and because of the fact that most ‘monsters’ could be seen to represent some repressed group or other and signify a disruption from normality, this essay must argue that Wood’s approach is more convincing.
Carroll, N. (1990) ‘The Philosophy of Horror: Or Paradoxes of the Heart’. Routledge: London.
Hills, M. (2005) ‘The Pleasures of Horror’. Continuum: London.
IMDb ‘The Internet Movie Database’. [WWW]Date Accessed 15/03/2006.
Jancovich, M. (1992) ‘Horror’. Batsford: London.
Leffler, Y. (2000) ‘Horror As Pleasure: The Aesthetics of Horror Fiction’. Almqvist and Wiksell International: Sweden.
Russell, D.J. (1998) ‘Monster Roundup: Reintegrating the Horror Genre’ in Nick Browne (ed) ‘Refiguring American Film Genres’. University of California Press: Berkely.
Virgin (2004) ‘The Twelfth Virgin Film Guide’. Virgin Books Ltd: London.
Wood, R. (1986) ‘The American Nightmare: Horror in the 70’s’ in ‘Hollywood From Vietnam to Reagan’. Columbia University Press: New York.
Noel Carroll introduces the term ‘Art-Horror’ as a general theory of horror texts, to 'emphasise the contrast with natural horror' (1990: 13), and claims that to be ‘art-horrified’ is essentially an emotion and that 'this emotion [is what] constitutes the identifying mark of horror' (1990: 13). He goes on to claim that 'monsters are a mark of horror' (1990: 13), and therefore the emotion of ‘art-horror’ must be in response a ‘monster’, his theory does not accept the existence of ‘horror’ texts sans ‘monster’.
Carroll claims that 'the characters in works of horror exemplify for us the way in which to react to the monsters in the fiction' (Carroll, 1990: 17), in other words, if the protagonist, Ripley (Sigourney Weaver) in Alien, is scared then the audience should mirror this emotion. Carroll lists a number of ways in which a character should respond to a ‘monster’, firstly, they should 'shrink from the monster, contracting themselves in order to avoid the grip of the creature but also to avert an accidental brush against this unclean being' (1990: 17). This desire to ‘avoid the grip of the creature’ can be seen clearly in Alien, most prominently when Ripley coaxes the ‘monster’ out from its hiding place in the escape shuttle. She turns her back to the creature, allowing it to approach her, which at the same time partially disagrees with Carroll’s assumption of avoidance, but however, as soon as she sees the alien, she runs and screams. This theory of avoidance is limited partially by the fact that the very nature of cinema is that the audience has a superior knowledge to the characters, therefore our emotion will not always mirror theirs. For example, one of the crew members in Alien climbs down a ladder towards the ‘monster’, clearly fearing what is at the bottom, we however, know the alien will be there and so we are more apprehensive than scared.
The emotion of being ‘Art-Horrified’ consists of 'both physical and cognitive dimensions' (1990: 24) according to Carroll. He goes on to explain that this 'occurent emotional state is one in which some physically abnormal state of felt agitation has been caused by the subjects’ cognitive construct and evaluation of his/her situation' (1990: 27). Therefore, if Ripley experiences the emotion of fear, it will manifest itself as a physical change and as the emotions of the audience are supposed to reflect that of the characters’, we should experience a physical change also. Carroll explains this as the audience being 'in an analogous state to that which fictional characters beset by monsters are described to be in' (1990: 27). The characters in Alien respond to the ‘monster’ with fear and disgust and experience a physical transition which is represented by their movement, be it running from the creature or simply shaking. Carroll defines this as a cognitive-evaluative theory, in other words, thought leads to the emotion of ‘art-horror’ in response to the ‘monster’. Carroll applies this theory to Dracula, but I will adapt it for Alien; there must be 'some state of abnormal, physically felt agitation' which has been caused by 'the thought: that (the alien) is a possible being', and 'by the evaluative thoughts that … (The alien) has the property of being physically (and perhaps morally and socially) threatening in the ways portrayed in the fiction' and that it 'has the property of being impure'. (1990: 27).
The property of ‘being impure’ is built upon by Carroll, who claims that '[One] cannot be art-horrified by an entity that [is not] impure' (1990:28). In Alien, the monster can be considered impure and indeed a ‘fusion’ character because of its acid blood instead of the pure life-giving blood of humans, and its ‘mouth-within-a-mouth’ which appears alongside human qualities such as basic physique and limbs. These apparent binary oppositions of alien and human qualities constitute impurity; 'an object or being is impure if it is categorically interstitial, categorically contradictory, incomplete or formless' (1990: 32).
Carroll lists three ways ‘monsters’ should be perceived by characters in ‘art-horror’; firstly, there must exist a 'theme of visceral revulsion', which I have already alluded to with Ripley’s recoil from the alien. Carroll expands on this point by claiming 'emotionally, these violations of nature are so fulsome and revolting that they frequently produce in characters the conviction that mere physical contact with them can be lethal' (1990: 22). In fact, this ‘conviction of lethality’ is confirmed in Alien by the discovery of their ‘acid-blood’ and their witnessed killings. 'Indescribability' is Carroll’s second condition; the alien is referred to many times without being given a specific name, it is called 'it', 'son of a bitch' and one of the character even states it is 'like a man, it’s huge', reducing his description to the only language he knows. Finally, the ‘monster’ must be 'unclean and disgusting' (1990: 18); there are many images in Alien of the ‘monsters’ mouths opening up, dripping saliva and inducing reactions of disgust and loathing clearly visible on the characters’ faces.
Carroll claims that 'monsters are not only physically threatening, they are also cognitively threatening' (1990: 34). In Alien, the ‘monsters’ are undoubtedly physically threatening, but they are not simply mindless killing machines, they also exhibit an intelligence. When Ripley’s escape ship takes off, several aliens become dislodged from underneath of the craft, apparently having had the intelligence to try and escape with Ripley. The importance of the cognitive threat is compounded by Carroll when he claims that 'it is a remarkable fact about the creatures of horror that very often they do not seem to be of sufficient strength to make a grown man cower' (1990:34), in other words, they are cognitively threatening, rather than physically, in Alien, the ‘monsters’ are both.
In regard to the ‘monsters’ in horror fictions, Carroll describes a four-point ‘complex discovery plot’. Firstly, Onset: 'the monster’s presence is established for the audience' (1990: 99) and secondly, discovery; 'an individual or group learns of the existence of the monster' (:100). However, in Alien these two points cannot be separated out because the audience discovers the ‘monster’ at the same time as the characters do. The third point is ‘Confirmation’, which again, cannot directly be applied to Alien because Carroll claims that the 'discoverers … of the monster convincing some other group of the existence of the creature' (1990: 101). Because of the small crew of the spaceship in Alien, all members of the crew witness the ‘monsters’ and therefore no-one needs convincing of its existence. The fourth point, confrontation, is where 'humanity marches out to meet its monster' … 'in problem/solution format' (1990: 102-3), exemplified by Ripley succeeding in destroying the alien and escaping from the ship. Not all texts follow this basic narrative structure however, therefore using Carroll we cannot analyse these and call them ‘art-horror’.
The basis of Robin Wood’s general theory of horror and monstrosity is that 'normality is threatened by the monster' (Wood, 1986: 78), in Alien, the relative normality of life in space is disrupted by the appearance of ‘monsters’. Wood’s theory comprises three components; normality, the monster and the relationship between the two. Normality, which is 'in general, boringly constant' (1986: 79) can be seen in the ‘stasis’ or ‘sleep’ that the characters are in at the start of the film, until the appearance of the alien. The 'relationship between the two' i.e, normality and the monster, is what 'constitutes the essential subject of the horror film' (1986: 79). The entire narrative of Alien is concerned with a striving to return to a normality (by destroying the alien), which can never entirely be recovered.
Wood builds upon the Freudian idea of repression and distinguishes between ‘basic repression’ and ‘surplus repression’. He claims ‘basic repression’ is what all members of society must undergo in order to be considered human, and surplus repression 'makes us into monogamous heterosexual bourgeois patriarchal capitalists … that is, if it works' (1986: 71). Wood then builds on his argument to claim that horror is a 'struggle for recognition of all that our civilisation represses or oppresses, its re-emergence dramatized as … an object of horror … and the happy ending (when it exists) typically signifying the restoration of repression' (Wood, 1986: 75). The ‘monster’ (the alien) therefore, represents the dramatization and return of the repressed ‘Other’ in society.
Wood outlines eight repressed terms which are represented by 'monstrous embodiments' (1986: 75); Other people, woman, the proletariat, other cultures, ethnic groups, alternative ideologies or political systems, deviations from ideological sexual norms and children. (1986: 75). When looking at Alien, one of the most applicable repressed terms must be ‘woman’. Wood claims the 'woman’s autonomy and independence are denied' (1986: 75), and the aliens’ predatory behaviour towards Ripley can be seen as a representation of this. However, her victory over the alien and according to Wood, the 'restoration of the repressed' signifies woman’s victory over patriarchy and Ripley’s return, not to her previous patriarchal oppression, but to her symbolic freedom, due to the fact that the rest of the crew have been killed. Therefore, Wood’s theory does not entirely fit.
The repressed ‘proletariat’ is explained by Wood as a projection of the 'bourgeois obsession with cleanliness' (1986: 74). This could be represented in Alien as the clean, almost clinical spaceship being soiled by not only the alien’s presence, but by its secretions in the form of its saliva and blood. The alien may be seen as the return of Wood’s repressed ‘ethnic group’ or indeed ‘other cultures’, as it is not considered human, it is the ‘Other’, and its destruction represents a return to repression and a homogenous ‘human’ society. Wood claims that the representation of ethnic groups is acceptable only if 'they keep their ghetto’s and don’t trouble us with their otherness' or 'they behave as we do and become replicas of the good bourgeois' (1986: 75), which obviously does not happen in Alien, the aliens are aggressive and move onto the ship. Repressed bi-sexuality or homosexuality is represented by the phallic nature by which the alien ‘spawn’ impregnates a male crew member by inserting itself down his throat. The repression returns again however when the spawn detaches itself and dies, returning to symbolic heterosexual normality.
Wood distinguishes between ‘progressive’ and ‘reactionary’ horror, where 'radical [progressive] horror has the monster representing oppressed and repressed forces [for which we have sympathy], while reactionary horror depicts its monsters as "simply evil" and totally non-human' (1986: 192), and Hills consolidates this point by stating that 'Wood posits horror monsters as either sustaining audience identification /sympathy OR as being totally dehumanised, repulsive and threatening' (2005: 50). We can consider Alien a reactionary text, the ‘monster’ is an evil force and we feel no sympathy for it. This approach could be considered more useful than Carroll’s approach however, which dictates that we may never feel sympathy for the ‘monster’, we may only see them as ‘dehumanised’, ‘repulsive’ and ‘threatening’ in a progressive approach. In the fourth film of the series, Alien Resurrection (1997), we distinctly feel sorry for the ‘monster’, to which we learn Ripley has an attachment. This is acceptable according to Wood’s theory, but not Carroll’s. Hills claims that in progressive horror fictions the 'audience revels in the monsters threat to dominant social/cultural norms', which can easily be applied to Alien in the sense that we watch the film in order to see what the ‘monster’ will do and how it will disrupt the ‘norm’. Hills builds on Wood’s approach stating that in reactionary texts 'audiences take pleasure in the monsters narrative destruction and hence the restoration of social/cultural order' (2005: 50), which complies with both Wood and Carroll.
Carroll points out a major criticism of his own work in that he 'hasn’t actually done any empirical research into the reception of the works of horror by audiences. He doesn’t know that they find horrific monsters disgusting and impure. At best, he’s identified his own reaction and introspection and projected it onto everyone else' (1990: 30). This does not mean that his theory of ‘monstrosity’ is inaccurate, but in order to make it more convincing he would need to back it up with empirical research. The same is true of Wood whose theory is simply based on his own assumptions and experiences.
The most obvious limit to Carroll’s theory is that his definition of art-horror only applies to texts with a ‘monster’ which has specific characteristics such as ‘impurity’ and ‘interstitiality’, and is responded to in specific ways. Therefore, a film with a serial-killer for example cannot, by Carroll’s standards be thought of as horror, despite the fact that films such as The Shining (1980) and Psycho (1960) are consistently considered a staple of the genre. It is a 'blanket omission of an entire sub-category of horror: the psychokiller horror film' (Russell, 1998: 238). Carroll’s entity based, cognitive-aesthetic approach provides three strict stipulations: i) Emotion is cognitive, ii) Emotion is always directed at an object, and iii) A monster is what distinguishes horror (1990: 26-37). This approach can be considered useful in the sense that it narrows down what could be termed horror, and filters out ‘genre-bending’ films, but it is severely limited because it does not accept films without a monster even though they might induce the ‘emotion’ and ‘altered physical state’ of art-horror, for example the ‘cinema of terror’ which has no ‘monster’.
Wood’s theory can perhaps be seen as more useful, because it allows for a broader range of ‘monsters’, however, they must represent the return of some repressed group or other. Jancovich argues that 'the horror monster is not always, or even usually, that which is repressed. It is frequently that which is repressive' (1992: 16), if this is the case, we have to consider whether a text with a ‘repressive monster’ can be considered horror by Wood’s definition. Carroll’s theory does not require the ‘monster’ to symbolise, or represent any such thing as the repressed, which means that to Carroll, a horror fiction can have a ‘monster’ for ‘monsters’’ sake without any need for it to represent something else.
Wood’s claim that a horror text can be either progressive or reactionary is useful because it allows for purely evil ‘monsters’, as well as those the audience may have pity for. Carroll’s theory however, only allows ‘monsters’ who are ‘impure’, ‘disgusting’ and repel the characters, and by virtue we feel no sympathy for. For example, Species (1995) may not be regarded as ‘horror’ according to Carroll, but can according to Wood because characters are actually attracted to the ‘monster’. However, this can also be linked to the exclusion of ‘serial killers’ by Carroll, for we are much more likely to feel sympathy for a ‘monster’ who exhibits human characteristics which in turn are only allowed by Wood, over those who are impure and non-human, according to Carroll.
Wood's notion that a ‘monster’ should disrupt normality is useful because it can clearly be applied easily to most horror films in one sense or another. However, this does not account for horror texts where the characters have become used to the ‘monster’ and it may have become part of their normal lives. Carroll’s theory agrees with Wood’s, because we are not going to experience the emotion of ‘art-horror’ in response to a disgusting and terrifying ‘monster’ if it is considered ‘normal’.
According to Carroll, the audience's emotions should mirror that of the characters’ in the text, and generally, this can be seen as useful because to some extent we will always be scared when the protagonist is. However, this is severely limited by the fact that the audience will usually have a superior knowledge to the characters, which renders impossible an exact mirroring of emotions in regard to a specific situation or a ‘monster’. Wood’s theory however allows us to experience our ‘own’ emotions in response to a ‘monster’, we do not have to mirror the characters’ and this is useful because Wood does not try to predict the emotions of the audience, especially without any empirical research.
Jancovich claims that ‘monsters’ should not be the defining feature of horror texts, rather 'if there is any feature which all horror texts share, it is probably the position of the victim – the figure under threat' (1996: 118), he does not claim that they have to be under threat from a ‘monster’ which therefore disagrees with Carroll’s theory. However, the figure could theoretically be under threat from some of entity/situation which represents the ‘repressed’, agreeing with Wood.
Carroll’s theory could be described as overly cognitive in the sense that he claims the emotion of art-horror is resultant from a thought process regarding the aesthetics of the text. However, we must consider the possibility of being ‘art-horrified’ by a text simply because it shocks the audience, the emotion being simply a reflex and not the result of cognition. However, he claims that we must be ‘art-horrified’ by a monster, and therefore even if our emotion was just a reflex, in order for it to be considered, it would have to be in response to a ‘monster’ for Carroll. Building on this, he claims that the ‘monster’ must be ‘physically and cognitively’ threatening, which immediately rules out ‘monsters’ which are simply violent, killing machines, as indeed, ‘Alien’ could be considered. Similarly, Wood’s theory could be described as overly psychoanalytical, only allowing ‘monsters’ which symbolise the repressed, and ruling out those which cannot be attributed to any obvious repression.
Overall, the theories of both Carroll and Wood have their uses which have been outlined, and limits which are most obviously, that a horror text must include a strictly defined ‘monster’, and that a ‘monster’ must represent the ‘repressed’ in society. Carroll’s theory accepts only the more ‘classic’ scary monsters, but does not allow for more contemporary psychological monsters. He is specific in his definition of the ‘monster’, which is useful because we are in no doubt about what can be considered a ‘monster’, but his theory is severely limited by his dismissal of many films, which are readily considered ‘horror’, but do not adhere to his conditions. Wood’s theory seems to have less limits than Carroll’s, and because of the fact that most ‘monsters’ could be seen to represent some repressed group or other and signify a disruption from normality, this essay must argue that Wood’s approach is more convincing.
Carroll, N. (1990) ‘The Philosophy of Horror: Or Paradoxes of the Heart’. Routledge: London.
Hills, M. (2005) ‘The Pleasures of Horror’. Continuum: London.
IMDb ‘The Internet Movie Database’. [WWW]
Jancovich, M. (1992) ‘Horror’. Batsford: London.
Leffler, Y. (2000) ‘Horror As Pleasure: The Aesthetics of Horror Fiction’. Almqvist and Wiksell International: Sweden.
Russell, D.J. (1998) ‘Monster Roundup: Reintegrating the Horror Genre’ in Nick Browne (ed) ‘Refiguring American Film Genres’. University of California Press: Berkely.
Virgin (2004) ‘The Twelfth Virgin Film Guide’. Virgin Books Ltd: London.
Wood, R. (1986) ‘The American Nightmare: Horror in the 70’s’ in ‘Hollywood From Vietnam to Reagan’. Columbia University Press: New York.
Structure, Agency, Identity and the Media...
Woodward defines ‘structure’ as 'the forces beyond our control which shape our identities' and ‘agency’ as 'the degree of control which we ourselves can exert over who we are' (Woodward, 2000: 6), and it is the supposed ‘tension’ between the two which construct identity. However, this essay will argue that ‘structure’ and ‘agency’ cannot be fully separated out, that they are not binary opposites, but interlinked and interwoven aspects of identity. In other words, a person’s identity may be constructed through what can be perceived as ‘agency’ or their own choices, but this will always be influenced to some extent by ‘structure’, whether it be conscious or unconscious, adhering to or in reaction against physical structures or ideological ones. This essay will argue that ‘agency’ is simply a personalised extension of ‘structure’ and therefore ‘structure’ must be seen as the dominant contributor to the formation of identity. This essay will primarily use examples of gender identity and femininity.
We can define ‘structures’ as outside influences on identity, such as family, friends, government, the media (meaning advertising and portrayals of gender within television, film and magazines) and other various institutions. However, we can also include more ideological ‘structures’ in this list, such as patriarchy, homophobia and feminine stereotypes; and although these are non-corporeal their affect might even be more strongly felt than those embodied structures such as the media; the former is indeed a platform for the implementation and expression of the latter (Williams, 2000). Conversely, we can define ‘agency’ as personal choice, as the ways women choose to behave, appear and generally perform, perhaps in a ‘dramaturgical’ sense, their femininity. (Goffman, 1971). However, this essay argues that ‘true’ agency cannot exist because of the ubiquity of ‘structural’ pressures, and even if individuals are not directly conforming to these pressures, then they may be reacting against them, which implies they are still aware of and are in fact being influenced by them.
Woodward claims that 'although as individuals we have to take up identities actively, those identities are necessarily the product of the society in which we live' (2000: 6), she builds on the work of Althusser (1971) which claims that we are ‘interpellated’, or ‘hailed’ into certain identity positions. This implies some degree of ‘agency’ in the way we choose which identities to ‘take up’, however, it is debatable whether there is any real choice at all because our ‘interpellation’ is determined by ‘structure’. The media defines what a woman ‘should’ look like, for example, ‘Marie Claire’ women’s magazine contains numerous images of thin, svelte and attractive models showing women everywhere ideals of ‘femininity’ and what a ‘real women’ should look like. Adverts for ‘Louis Vuitton’, ‘Dolce & Gabbana’, ‘Emporio Armani’ and ‘Prada’, as well as articles and features portray and reinforce this ‘ideal woman’ image (Marie Claire, March 2006). Again, ‘structure’ can be seen as more important than ‘agency’ in the formation of identity.
Woodward talks about ‘body projects’ and claims that 'people attempt to alter or improve the appearance, size and shape of their bodies in line with their own designs' (2000: 16), again implying some degree of ‘agency’. However, if they are following examples from the media or other ‘structures’, then they are not acting on ‘their own designs’, they are influenced by these ‘structures’. Woodward also claims that 'people resist dominant cultural representations of identity' (2000: 38), a statement which can easily be applied to gender; the women who actively do not look how magazines and other ‘structures’ tell them they should look. However, these women are reacting against ‘structure’ in the form of media representations of femininity, and their highly individualised response may be perceived as ‘agency’. However, this ‘agency’ is a direct result of a rejection of ‘structure’, which therefore renders ‘structure’ as the dominant, influential, albeit indirect, contributor to the formation of feminine identity.
Goffman’s theory of ‘giving’ and ‘giving off’ (1971) can be applied to gender identity, especially femininity. He claims that to ‘give’ information involves the use of symbols 'which he [or she] uses admittedly and solely to convey the information that he [or she] and the others are known to attach to these symbols' (1971: 1), in other words, if a woman is dressed in ‘woman’s’ clothes then she ‘gives’ the impression of femininity. To ‘give off’ information implies that 'the action was performed for reasons other than the information conveyed in this way' (1971: 2), for instance, a woman may be dressed in feminine clothes but she may unintentionally ‘give off’ the impression that she is not comfortable dressed in such a way and that she is simply trying to conform to accepted feminine stereotypes and trends. This choice of dress could be seen as ‘agency’ in the way she can choose what she wears and how she appears, but ‘structural’ influences, such as friends and the media dictate how a woman ‘should look’ and therefore must have some affect on how she appears. On the surface, ‘agency’ appears to exist in choice, but this choice is limited and affected by ‘structure’.
This lack of choice is emphasised in Kathy Davis’s piece on breast augmentation, she argues that women do not really have ‘true’ agency, only partial ‘agency’; 'cosmetic surgery is a choice – albeit a choice taken under conditions which are not of women’s own making' (1995: 120), she also says 'given the enormous pressure on women to meet the prevailing standards of beauty, can we ever speak of consent which is freely given' (1995: 117). Therefore, on the surface we have to argue that women obviously have the choice of whether to have surgery or not, however, these ‘structural’, 'ubiquitous pressures upon women to meet the cultural definitions of beauty' (1995: 119) must have an enormous affect. If a woman chooses to have surgery, it could be argued that she is exerting ‘agency’ and simply doing it for herself, but we cannot know how much ‘structural’ pressures are consciously or subconsciously influencing her decision. In Davis’s study, 'many women expressed indignation about the assumption that they have been pressured into having their breasts augmented' (1995: 127), which disagrees with a ‘structural’ approach, however, their formation of feminine identity through breast augmentation must be considered the result of some ‘structural’ force or another, otherwise women would feel no need to do it. Davis, a self-confessed feminist and proponent of women’s ‘agency’, constructs a superficially convincing argument, however, she presents her case studies as having had a 'valiant struggle for one’s self rather than capitulation to the norms or wishes of others' (1995: 133) and emphasises that “they were not compelled to have their breasts augmented and, indeed, encountered considerable resistance to their decision” (1995: 136). Davis posits these women within a 'heroic tale' (1995: 133), for they may be resisting ‘structures’ such as their husbands or partners and their family and exhibiting ‘agency’, whilst ultimately pandering to broader social ‘structures’ and 'particular notions of femininity' (Benson in Woodward, 1997: 70).
Giddens claims that 'the selection or creation of lifestyles is influenced by group pressures and the visibility of role models as well as by socio-economic circumstances' (1991: 82). This idea of ‘role models’ is of paramount importance and can be linked to previous points about the effects of media and advertising, whether it be ‘mainstream’ (fashion magazines) or ‘alternative’ (e.g. music magazines such as the NME) role-models. In regard to more ‘alternative’ role-models, Benson states that 'the image of the thin, svelte, youthful woman is not the only one available to women in the mass media. But it is certainly one of the most significant ways in which femininity is imaged, and one of the most seductive' (1997: 141). Giddens’ use of the phrase 'selection or creation of lifestyles' implies a degree of ‘agency’ and a rejection of a ‘hypodermic syringe’ style effects model, however, this is then partially rejected by the assertion of 'group pressures'. Giddens’ theory therefore agrees with the argument put forth in this essay; that individuals do have some choice in the formation of their own identity, but this ‘agency’ will always be influenced by social ‘structures’.
The notion of patriarchy as a dominant ‘structure’ which influences the formation of gendered and feminine identity is alluded to in Fen Coles’ piece on female ‘Bodybuilding’. She claims 'patriarchal ideology depends on and enforces the idea that sex, gender and sexuality come together "naturally" as a package, i.e. you are born female, therefore you must naturally be feminine and heterosexual' (1999: 445). Coles’s bodybuilders could be seen as exerting a sense of ‘agency’ in the way they choose not to conform to this image of femininity, however, her piece goes on to say 'in a bid to apologise for and to soften female muscle, repeated strategies are employed to ensex, engender and heterosexualise the female bodybuilder’s disturbing physique' (1999: 445). This apparent need to ‘apologise’ for a lack of femininity is clearly influenced by ‘structures’, in the form of the media, patriarchy, homophobia and indeed the bodybuilding industry itself; 'get feminine or get out of competitive bodybuilding' (1999: 446). The initial ‘agency’ which is exerted by a rejection of traditional notions of femininity and development of distinctly masculine coded muscles, is overshadowed by these women’s compliance with ‘structures’ which dictate that they must use 'passing strategies' (1999: 446). Female bodybuilders are encouraged to hide and disguise their muscles and ‘lack’ (we will not venture into a Freudian debate here) of femininity, with breast implants, make-up and brightly coloured bikinis, in order to pass as feminine as heterosexual in society; 'When the overt display of muscles is called for at competition time and the near naked body staged, feminine props/apologies are called in to reinscribe or ‘renaturalise’ the female bodybuilder' (1999: 446). These women must continue to respect the ‘structures’ that are forcing them to appear feminine, because demonstrating a sense of ‘agency’ and a refusal to conform would be detrimental to their professional careers; spectators outside the bodybuilding world would be unlikely to accept women who ‘disregard their femininity’ because they are themselves influenced by ‘structure’. Cole goes on to say that 'there are a growing number of female competitors who have not only no interest in pandering to conventions (in terms of muscle size), but who actively enjoy the confusion that their bulk provides' (1999: 449). This illustrates a minority growth in ‘agency’ for some competitors, but this rejection of accepted ‘structural’ norms again demonstrates an awareness and conscious rebuke of what is deemed acceptable ‘feminine’ behaviour and appearance. Therefore, ‘structures’ here are again dictating any ‘agency’, in the form of a rejection, rendering ‘structure’ dominant in the formation of identity.
Robin Williams (2000) perfectly and eloquently sums up the main argument of this essay, so I will take the liberty to quote at length; he claims 'the matter of identity is neither the subjective achievement of the rational individual subject alone or with others, nor the reflection within the individual subject of already existing stable collective attributes. Identity is a feature of human life produced – alongside other attributes of human subjectivity – as an affect of the operation of social and cultural structures which are necessarily prior to meaningful individual thought and action' (Williams, 2000: 38).
In conclusion therefore, ‘structure’ and ‘agency’ are intertwined; they cannot be feasibly separated into two distinct entities, because as this essay has argued, ‘agency’ is simply an extension of and/or reaction to social ‘structure’. An individual may possess, or indeed believe to possess some degree of agency which is demonstrated by personal choice in the decisions they make which formulate their identity, however, we must take into account the ubiquity and debatable omnipotence of social ‘structures’, namely, the media, family, friends and ideological structures such as patriarchy, homophobia and gender stereotypes. This essay has argued that ‘structures’ influence personal choice and identity in subtle, and indeed more obvious ways, further; ‘agency’ can be seen as simply a personalised front for ‘structural’ influences. It can therefore be argued that ‘true’ agency does not in fact exist, or indeed that any partial ‘agency’ can exist in isolation from ‘structure’, rendering the latter the dominant contributor to the formation of identity.
Benson, Susan, 'The Body, Health and Eating Disorders' in Woodward, Kathryn (ed) (1997) Identity and Difference. London: Sage.
Coles, Fen, 'Feminine Charms and Outrageous Arms' in Price, Janet and Shildrick, Margrit (eds) (1999) Feminist Theory and the Body: A Reader. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
Davis, Kathy (1995), ‘Reshaping the Female Body’: The Dilemma of Cosmetic Surgery. London: Routledge.
Giddens, Anthony (1991), Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age. Cambridge: Polity/Blackwell.
Goffman, Erving (1959), The Presentation of the Self in Everyday Life. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1971.
O’Riordan, Marie (ed), Marie Claire. March 2006 UK Edition. London: IPC Media.
Shilling, Chris, 'The Body and Difference' in Woodward, Kathryn (ed) (1997) Identity and Difference. London: Sage.
Williams, Robin (2000), Making Identity Matter – Identity, Society and Social Interaction. Durham: Sociologypress.
Woodward, Kathryn, “Concepts of Identity and Difference” in Woodward, Kathryn (ed) (1997) Identity and Difference. London: Sage.
Woodward, Kathryn, “Questions of Identity” in Woodward, Kath (ed) (2000) Questioning Identity: Gender, Class, Nation. London: Sage.
We can define ‘structures’ as outside influences on identity, such as family, friends, government, the media (meaning advertising and portrayals of gender within television, film and magazines) and other various institutions. However, we can also include more ideological ‘structures’ in this list, such as patriarchy, homophobia and feminine stereotypes; and although these are non-corporeal their affect might even be more strongly felt than those embodied structures such as the media; the former is indeed a platform for the implementation and expression of the latter (Williams, 2000). Conversely, we can define ‘agency’ as personal choice, as the ways women choose to behave, appear and generally perform, perhaps in a ‘dramaturgical’ sense, their femininity. (Goffman, 1971). However, this essay argues that ‘true’ agency cannot exist because of the ubiquity of ‘structural’ pressures, and even if individuals are not directly conforming to these pressures, then they may be reacting against them, which implies they are still aware of and are in fact being influenced by them.
Woodward claims that 'although as individuals we have to take up identities actively, those identities are necessarily the product of the society in which we live' (2000: 6), she builds on the work of Althusser (1971) which claims that we are ‘interpellated’, or ‘hailed’ into certain identity positions. This implies some degree of ‘agency’ in the way we choose which identities to ‘take up’, however, it is debatable whether there is any real choice at all because our ‘interpellation’ is determined by ‘structure’. The media defines what a woman ‘should’ look like, for example, ‘Marie Claire’ women’s magazine contains numerous images of thin, svelte and attractive models showing women everywhere ideals of ‘femininity’ and what a ‘real women’ should look like. Adverts for ‘Louis Vuitton’, ‘Dolce & Gabbana’, ‘Emporio Armani’ and ‘Prada’, as well as articles and features portray and reinforce this ‘ideal woman’ image (Marie Claire, March 2006). Again, ‘structure’ can be seen as more important than ‘agency’ in the formation of identity.
Woodward talks about ‘body projects’ and claims that 'people attempt to alter or improve the appearance, size and shape of their bodies in line with their own designs' (2000: 16), again implying some degree of ‘agency’. However, if they are following examples from the media or other ‘structures’, then they are not acting on ‘their own designs’, they are influenced by these ‘structures’. Woodward also claims that 'people resist dominant cultural representations of identity' (2000: 38), a statement which can easily be applied to gender; the women who actively do not look how magazines and other ‘structures’ tell them they should look. However, these women are reacting against ‘structure’ in the form of media representations of femininity, and their highly individualised response may be perceived as ‘agency’. However, this ‘agency’ is a direct result of a rejection of ‘structure’, which therefore renders ‘structure’ as the dominant, influential, albeit indirect, contributor to the formation of feminine identity.
Goffman’s theory of ‘giving’ and ‘giving off’ (1971) can be applied to gender identity, especially femininity. He claims that to ‘give’ information involves the use of symbols 'which he [or she] uses admittedly and solely to convey the information that he [or she] and the others are known to attach to these symbols' (1971: 1), in other words, if a woman is dressed in ‘woman’s’ clothes then she ‘gives’ the impression of femininity. To ‘give off’ information implies that 'the action was performed for reasons other than the information conveyed in this way' (1971: 2), for instance, a woman may be dressed in feminine clothes but she may unintentionally ‘give off’ the impression that she is not comfortable dressed in such a way and that she is simply trying to conform to accepted feminine stereotypes and trends. This choice of dress could be seen as ‘agency’ in the way she can choose what she wears and how she appears, but ‘structural’ influences, such as friends and the media dictate how a woman ‘should look’ and therefore must have some affect on how she appears. On the surface, ‘agency’ appears to exist in choice, but this choice is limited and affected by ‘structure’.
This lack of choice is emphasised in Kathy Davis’s piece on breast augmentation, she argues that women do not really have ‘true’ agency, only partial ‘agency’; 'cosmetic surgery is a choice – albeit a choice taken under conditions which are not of women’s own making' (1995: 120), she also says 'given the enormous pressure on women to meet the prevailing standards of beauty, can we ever speak of consent which is freely given' (1995: 117). Therefore, on the surface we have to argue that women obviously have the choice of whether to have surgery or not, however, these ‘structural’, 'ubiquitous pressures upon women to meet the cultural definitions of beauty' (1995: 119) must have an enormous affect. If a woman chooses to have surgery, it could be argued that she is exerting ‘agency’ and simply doing it for herself, but we cannot know how much ‘structural’ pressures are consciously or subconsciously influencing her decision. In Davis’s study, 'many women expressed indignation about the assumption that they have been pressured into having their breasts augmented' (1995: 127), which disagrees with a ‘structural’ approach, however, their formation of feminine identity through breast augmentation must be considered the result of some ‘structural’ force or another, otherwise women would feel no need to do it. Davis, a self-confessed feminist and proponent of women’s ‘agency’, constructs a superficially convincing argument, however, she presents her case studies as having had a 'valiant struggle for one’s self rather than capitulation to the norms or wishes of others' (1995: 133) and emphasises that “they were not compelled to have their breasts augmented and, indeed, encountered considerable resistance to their decision” (1995: 136). Davis posits these women within a 'heroic tale' (1995: 133), for they may be resisting ‘structures’ such as their husbands or partners and their family and exhibiting ‘agency’, whilst ultimately pandering to broader social ‘structures’ and 'particular notions of femininity' (Benson in Woodward, 1997: 70).
Giddens claims that 'the selection or creation of lifestyles is influenced by group pressures and the visibility of role models as well as by socio-economic circumstances' (1991: 82). This idea of ‘role models’ is of paramount importance and can be linked to previous points about the effects of media and advertising, whether it be ‘mainstream’ (fashion magazines) or ‘alternative’ (e.g. music magazines such as the NME) role-models. In regard to more ‘alternative’ role-models, Benson states that 'the image of the thin, svelte, youthful woman is not the only one available to women in the mass media. But it is certainly one of the most significant ways in which femininity is imaged, and one of the most seductive' (1997: 141). Giddens’ use of the phrase 'selection or creation of lifestyles' implies a degree of ‘agency’ and a rejection of a ‘hypodermic syringe’ style effects model, however, this is then partially rejected by the assertion of 'group pressures'. Giddens’ theory therefore agrees with the argument put forth in this essay; that individuals do have some choice in the formation of their own identity, but this ‘agency’ will always be influenced by social ‘structures’.
The notion of patriarchy as a dominant ‘structure’ which influences the formation of gendered and feminine identity is alluded to in Fen Coles’ piece on female ‘Bodybuilding’. She claims 'patriarchal ideology depends on and enforces the idea that sex, gender and sexuality come together "naturally" as a package, i.e. you are born female, therefore you must naturally be feminine and heterosexual' (1999: 445). Coles’s bodybuilders could be seen as exerting a sense of ‘agency’ in the way they choose not to conform to this image of femininity, however, her piece goes on to say 'in a bid to apologise for and to soften female muscle, repeated strategies are employed to ensex, engender and heterosexualise the female bodybuilder’s disturbing physique' (1999: 445). This apparent need to ‘apologise’ for a lack of femininity is clearly influenced by ‘structures’, in the form of the media, patriarchy, homophobia and indeed the bodybuilding industry itself; 'get feminine or get out of competitive bodybuilding' (1999: 446). The initial ‘agency’ which is exerted by a rejection of traditional notions of femininity and development of distinctly masculine coded muscles, is overshadowed by these women’s compliance with ‘structures’ which dictate that they must use 'passing strategies' (1999: 446). Female bodybuilders are encouraged to hide and disguise their muscles and ‘lack’ (we will not venture into a Freudian debate here) of femininity, with breast implants, make-up and brightly coloured bikinis, in order to pass as feminine as heterosexual in society; 'When the overt display of muscles is called for at competition time and the near naked body staged, feminine props/apologies are called in to reinscribe or ‘renaturalise’ the female bodybuilder' (1999: 446). These women must continue to respect the ‘structures’ that are forcing them to appear feminine, because demonstrating a sense of ‘agency’ and a refusal to conform would be detrimental to their professional careers; spectators outside the bodybuilding world would be unlikely to accept women who ‘disregard their femininity’ because they are themselves influenced by ‘structure’. Cole goes on to say that 'there are a growing number of female competitors who have not only no interest in pandering to conventions (in terms of muscle size), but who actively enjoy the confusion that their bulk provides' (1999: 449). This illustrates a minority growth in ‘agency’ for some competitors, but this rejection of accepted ‘structural’ norms again demonstrates an awareness and conscious rebuke of what is deemed acceptable ‘feminine’ behaviour and appearance. Therefore, ‘structures’ here are again dictating any ‘agency’, in the form of a rejection, rendering ‘structure’ dominant in the formation of identity.
Robin Williams (2000) perfectly and eloquently sums up the main argument of this essay, so I will take the liberty to quote at length; he claims 'the matter of identity is neither the subjective achievement of the rational individual subject alone or with others, nor the reflection within the individual subject of already existing stable collective attributes. Identity is a feature of human life produced – alongside other attributes of human subjectivity – as an affect of the operation of social and cultural structures which are necessarily prior to meaningful individual thought and action' (Williams, 2000: 38).
In conclusion therefore, ‘structure’ and ‘agency’ are intertwined; they cannot be feasibly separated into two distinct entities, because as this essay has argued, ‘agency’ is simply an extension of and/or reaction to social ‘structure’. An individual may possess, or indeed believe to possess some degree of agency which is demonstrated by personal choice in the decisions they make which formulate their identity, however, we must take into account the ubiquity and debatable omnipotence of social ‘structures’, namely, the media, family, friends and ideological structures such as patriarchy, homophobia and gender stereotypes. This essay has argued that ‘structures’ influence personal choice and identity in subtle, and indeed more obvious ways, further; ‘agency’ can be seen as simply a personalised front for ‘structural’ influences. It can therefore be argued that ‘true’ agency does not in fact exist, or indeed that any partial ‘agency’ can exist in isolation from ‘structure’, rendering the latter the dominant contributor to the formation of identity.
Benson, Susan, 'The Body, Health and Eating Disorders' in Woodward, Kathryn (ed) (1997) Identity and Difference. London: Sage.
Coles, Fen, 'Feminine Charms and Outrageous Arms' in Price, Janet and Shildrick, Margrit (eds) (1999) Feminist Theory and the Body: A Reader. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
Davis, Kathy (1995), ‘Reshaping the Female Body’: The Dilemma of Cosmetic Surgery. London: Routledge.
Giddens, Anthony (1991), Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age. Cambridge: Polity/Blackwell.
Goffman, Erving (1959), The Presentation of the Self in Everyday Life. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1971.
O’Riordan, Marie (ed), Marie Claire. March 2006 UK Edition. London: IPC Media.
Shilling, Chris, 'The Body and Difference' in Woodward, Kathryn (ed) (1997) Identity and Difference. London: Sage.
Williams, Robin (2000), Making Identity Matter – Identity, Society and Social Interaction. Durham: Sociologypress.
Woodward, Kathryn, “Concepts of Identity and Difference” in Woodward, Kathryn (ed) (1997) Identity and Difference. London: Sage.
Woodward, Kathryn, “Questions of Identity” in Woodward, Kath (ed) (2000) Questioning Identity: Gender, Class, Nation. London: Sage.
WNO Open House Weekend - 31st May-3rd June 2007
WNO Open House Weekend - 31st May-3rd June 2007
This May Bank Holiday weekend (Thursday 31 May-Sunday 3 June) sees the Wales Millennium Centre throw open its doors for a celebration of the Welsh National Opera’s new season. Open House is a programme of free events spanning the weekend which will showcase the diversity, talent and inner workings of Wales’ national opera company. The WMC provides the perfect backdrop for its most prominent resident, with every nook of the prestigious building filled to bursting point with operatic treats.
With a range of free performances, workshops, screenings, master classes, technical insight and operatic question times featuring the General Director of WNO John Fisher, fans and non-fans alike are spoilt for choice. 'Open House is designed to appeal as much to people who may never have been to an opera before as to those who already know and love the company and would like to get an insight into how we put a production together.'
For the full programme of Open House events check out http://www.wno.org.uk/. All events are free, however some are ticketed – Call WMC Ticket Office on 08700 40 2000 to reserve your space.
The Summer 2007 WNO Season runs from 11 May - 3 June and features an already sold-out Carmen along with performances of Redflight Barcud, Dolffin, Wild Cat, The Damnation of Faust, 7 Deadly Sins/Duke Bluebeard’s Castle and 4 Sacred Pieces/Belshazzar’s Feast.
To book: http://www.wmc.org.uk/
WMC Ticket Office: 08700 400 2000.
SARAH PAVEY
Locws 3 - Art Across the City
(Locws International 2007)
Locws 3 – ‘Art Across the City’ - Saturday 14 April – Sunday 13 May
It appears that Swansea is the place to be this month for art aficionados; from the 14th April to 13th May the city will be awash with temporary artistic representations and installations inspired by the cultural and historical surroundings of the Welsh city.
Locws International presents Locws 3 – Art Across the City which draws inspiration from nine locations across Swansea and brings artists from around the globe to create a spectacular city-wide display. Locws 3 aims to demonstrate 'a cross-section of contemporary art-practice from visual projections, performance and sound installations to photographic, object and material based works'.
Locws 3, as the name suggests, is the third time Locws International have utilised Swansea’s cultural backdrop, and the choice of location is key; Co-Director David Hastie says 'The artists have used a wide range of aspects of Swansea to create really thought-provoking pieces, they have spent time in the city, looking at its history and how it has evolved. There are works inspired by the Brangwyn panels, Dylan Thomas and even The Ospreys rugby team.'
So, regardless of the fact that only three of the artists are Welsh, the influences of the city and indeed country are integral in characterising each of the pieces. With as varied works as an orchestra of machines and an artist learning to fly, it’ll be fascinating to see how these influences emerge.
Access to all art-works are free and location maps will be available from Swansea Museum and The Guildhall during April.
Check out http://www.artacrossthecity.com/ for more information.
By SARAH L. PAVEY
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